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Granfinanciera, Northern Pipeline, and
"Public Rights": May a Bankruptcy
Judge Preside Over a Jury Trial?
INTRODUCTION
The Second Circuit held recently that a bankruptcy judge has
authority to preside over a jury trial in a "core" bankruptcy case
proceeding.' Some courts have agreed with this result, but many,
including the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, have held that bankruptcy
courts are not authorized to conduct jury trials. 2 This judicial
debate results from Congressional restructuring of jurisdiction in
the bankruptcy system: Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, 3 now modified by the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,4 following the Supreme Court's
decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co. 5
This Note evaluates a bankruptcy court's authority to conduct
a jury trial. It begins by discussing the historic background of
bankruptcy jurisdiction and the constitutional limitations placed
on Congress in defining that jurisdiction. 6 Then it examines the
Supreme Court's decision in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,7
which upheld a party's right to a jury trial in certain bankruptcy
proceedings but remained silent on the bankruptcy judge's author-
ity to preside over that jury trial.8 Next, this Note surveys and
analyzes judicial responses to Granfinanciera, noting lower courts'
Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394 (2d
Cir.), vacated, -U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990), previous opinion and judgment
reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, .... __U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
2 See In re United Missouri Bank, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Kaiser
Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990).
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
4 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
See infra notes 11-54 and accompanying text.
492 U.S. 33 (1989).
See infra notes 55-82 and accompanying text.
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attempts to resolve the issue of who is to conduct the jury trial
when the right exists. 9 Finally, it looks to the constitutionality of
jury trials in bankruptcy court, in light of Northern Pipeline and
Granfinanciera.10 Those decisions mandate the conclusion, though
not without complications, that a bankruptcy judge cannot consti-
tutionally conduct a jury trial.
I. THE HISTORY OF JURISDICTION IN THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
A. The 1978 Act
Before 1978, bankruptcy jurisdiction depended on the distinc-
tion between summary and plenary proceedings, as established by
the 1898 Act. 1 A bankruptcy referee exercised exclusive jurisdiction
over summary proceedings, which involved the court actually or
constructively possessing the bankruptcy res.'2 These proceedings
were equitable in nature and, with two exceptions, 3 provided no
jury element. On the other hand, plenary proceedings, such as
actions by the trustee to recover property of the bankruptcy estate,
did provide jury trials.1 4 These proceedings were beyond the bank-
ruptcy court's summary jurisdiction and were tried in federal dis-
trict court or in state court.' 5
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("the 1978 Act")' 6 elim-
inated the summary/plenary distinction.1 7 Bankruptcy courts, cast
as "adjuncts" of the federal district courts, were given authority
to preside over and provide jury trials in both plenary and summary
proceedings.' 8 Actions previously tried before a jury in state or
federal court now could be tried in bankruptcy court.
9 See infra notes 83-144 and accompanying text.
,0 See infra notes 145-186 and accompanying text.
" Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, §§ 1-70, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). See generally S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy:
Obeying the Commands of Article HlI and the Seventh Amendment, 72 MnN. L. REv. 967,
971 (1988) (tracing the history of jury trials in bankruptcy proceedings).
12 See Gibson, supra note 11, at 971-72.
11 A person against whom an involuntary petition had been filed could demand a jury
trial as to insolvency. In addition, under a 1970 amendment, the issue of dischargeability
of a debt could be tried before a jury in the bankruptcy court. See id. at 972.
14 See id.
is See id.
6 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1978).
See Gibson, supra note 11, at 984.
See, e.g., id. at 975.
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The 1978 Act's expansion of bankruptcy court jurisdiction
raised a constitutional question. Article III of the United States
Constitution requires that the "judicial power of the United States"
be vested in courts whose judges enjoy life tenure and irreducible
compensation. 19 The bankruptcy court is not such a court.2° The
question raised by the 1978 Act was whether that act impermissibly
vested such "judicial power" in the non-Article III bankruptcy
courts.
B. The Northern Pipeline Holding
The Supreme Court addressed the "judicial power" question
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.21
Justice William Brennan, who delivered the plurality opinion, de-
fined the issue as "whether the assignment by Congress to bank-
ruptcy judges of the jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 ...
by § 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violates Art. III of the
Constitution.' '
After reviewing the broad changes effected by the 1978 Act,2
Justice Brennan looked at Article III and enumerated its policies:
As an inseparable element of the constitutional system of
checks and balances, and as a guarantee of judicial impartiality,
Art. III both defines the power and protects the independence of
the Judicial Branch .... The judicial power of the United States
must be exercised by courts having the attributes described in
'9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
By so providing, Article III seeks to sever any dependence by the judiciary on the legislative
or executive branches. E.g., United States v. Will, 499 U.S. 200, 216-20 (1980).
[B]ankruptcy judges do not serve for life subject to their continued "good
Behavior." Rather, they are appointed for 14-year terms, and can be removed
by the judicial council of the circuit in which they serve on grounds of
"incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability."
Second, the salaries of the bankruptcy judges are not immune from diminution
by Congress.... In short, there is no doubt that the bankruptcy judges
created by the Act are not Art. III judges.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1982).
22 See id.
1 Id. at 52.




The "good Behavior" Clause guarantees that Art. III judges
shall enjoy life tenure, subject only to removal by impeach-
ment .... The Compensation Clause guarantees Art. III judges
a fixed and irreducible compensation for their services .... Both
of these provisions were incorporated into the Constitution to
ensure the independence of the Judiciary from the control of the
Executive and Legislative Branches of government. 24
In support of the Act, the appellants2l set forth essentially two
arguments. They first asserted that Congress, pursuant to its Article
I powers,26 could allow the non-Article III bankruptcy courts to
exercise the "judicial power." In response, the plurality noted that
Congress has been permitted to create so-called legislative courts
to handle matters otherwise confined to Article III courts in three
situations.
First, Congress can create "territorial" courts, such as in the
District of Columbia, where there is 'no division of powers be-
tween the general and state governments."' 27 Second, Congress can
form legislative courts in areas involving "a constitutional grant
of power that has been historically understood as giving the polit-
ical Branches of Government extraordinary control over the precise
subject matter at issue.' '28 Finally, Congress can provide legislative
courts and administrative agencies to adjudicate cases involving
"public rights. ' 29 Justice Brennan explained the public rights doc-
trine:
This doctrine may be explained in part by reference to the tra-
ditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes that
the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be
sued.... But the public-rights doctrine also draws upon the
principle of separation of powers, and a historical understanding
that certain prerogatives were reserved to the political Branches
24 Id. at 58-59 (citations omitted).
2 The appellant, Northern Pipeline, filed in bankruptcy court a suit against the
appellee, Marathon Pipe Line Co., seeking damages for breach of contract and warranty.
The suit was initiated after Marathon filed a reorganization petition in the bankruptcy
court. Marathon argued the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutionally gave Article III
judicial power to the bankruptcy judges and asked that the suit be dismissed. Id. at 50.
26 Id. at 62. Article I, section 8 grants the Congress power to "establish ... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
27 Id. at 64-65 (quoting Kendall v. U.S., 12 Pet. 524, 619 (1838)).
2 Id. at 66. Justice Brennan offered congressional power to administer courts-martial
as an example of this category. Id.
Id. at 67.
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of Government. The doctrine extends only to matters arising
"between the Government and persons subject to its authority in
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions
of the executive or legislative departments" . . and only to
matters that historically could have been determined exclusively
by those departments.... The understanding ... is that the
Framers expected that Congress would be free to commit such
matters completely to nonjudicial executive determination, and
that as a result there can be no constitutional objection to Con-
gress' employing the less drastic expedient of committing their
determination to a legislative court or an administrative agency. 0
Having outlined the three categories in which Congress may
avoid the requirements of Article III and thus vest the "judicial
power" in non-Article III courts, the plurality applied each to the
bankruptcy system. It disposed of the first two exceptions with
little discussion, holding that bankruptcy courts are not territorial,
nor do they resemble courts-martial.31
The plurality next held that the third category, public rights,
was not applicable because the action before it involved a contracts
issue between private parties, and "a matter of public rights must
at a minimum arise 'between the government and others."' 3 2 There-
fore, the action was not of the type that Congress legitimately
could assign to a non-Article III court.
As for Congress's power to "establish uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States, ' 33 the plu-
rality held that Congress may not avoid Article III in pursuit of
its Article I powers 4 Otherwise, Congress could erode Article III's
applicability by bringing a wide variety of actions under Article I:
Appellants' contention, in essence, is that pursuant to any of
its Art. I powers, Congress may create courts free of Art. III's
requirements whenever it finds that course expedient.... Al-
though the cases relied upon by appellants demonstrate that in-
dependent courts are not required for all federal adjudications,
"0 Id. at 67-68 (citations omitted).
" See id. at 71.
" Id. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)). The plurality
did acknowledge that "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core
of the federal bankruptcy power," may be a public right. Id. at 71. Later, in Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion,
retreated from this position. See infra notes 171-176 and accompanying text.
" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
34 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71.
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those cases also make it clear that where Art. III does apply, all
of the legislative powers specified in Art. I and elsewhere are
subject to it....
The flaw in appellants' analysis is that it provides no limiting
principle. It thus threatens to supplant completely our system of
adjudication in independent Art. III tribunals and replace it with
a system of "specialized" legislative courts .... The broad range
of questions that can be brought into a bankruptcy court because
they are "related to cases under title 11" . . . is the clearest proof
that even when Congress acts through a "specialized" court, and
pursuant to only one of its many Art. I powers, appellants'
analysis fails to provide any real protection against the erosion
of Art. III jurisdiction by the unilateral action of the political
branches. 31
Thus, the Court did not construe Article I's grant of specific
congressional powers as independently excepting cases related to
those powers from Article III's general rule. Because the bank-
ruptcy courts did not fit within any of the three recognized excep-
tions discussed previously, it would be improper for such courts to
exercise the "judicial power."
The appellants next claimed that bankruptcy courts, as "ad-
juncts" of the federal district courts, were not vested with the
"judicial power" of the United States. Rather, according to the
appellants, such power remained with the Article III district courts.3 6
Justice Brennan acknowledged that in some situations Congress
may assign certain fact-finding or other limited functions to ad-
juncts of Article III courts without impermissibly vesting the "ju-
dicial power" in such adjuncts. 37 Relying largely on Crowell v.
Benson38 and United States v. Raddat, 39 Justice Brennan defined
these situations:
Together these cases establish two principles that aid us in
determining the extent to which Congress may constitutionally
vest traditionally judicial functions in non-Art. III officers. First,
it is clear that when Congress creates a substantive federal right,
it possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which
35 Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted).
See id. at 76-77.
See id. at 77-78.
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
39 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
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that right may be adjudicated-including the assignment of some
functions historically performed by judges.... Second, the func-
tions of the adjunct must be limited in such a way that "the
essential attributes" of judicial power are retained in the Art. III
court.40
Therefore, if the bankruptcy courts, as adjuncts, did not decide
substantive federal rights, or if the district courts did not retain
sufficient control over these adjuncts, the bankruptcy adjunct sys-
tem violated Article III.
Justice Brennan applied these criteria to the bankruptcy adjunct
system. He argued that, unlike the situation in Crowell, where
Congress was given broad power to assign fact-finding functions
over congressionally created rights, the present case, involving a
state contracts suit in the context of a bankruptcy case, featured
no congressionally created rights. Instead, it involved "a right
created by state law, a right independent of and antecedent to the
reorganization petition that conferred jurisdiction upon the Bank-
ruptcy Court. " 41 Therefore, Congress's ability to utilize an adjunct
in this situation was severely limited.
Furthermore, the powers given to the bankruptcy courts far
exceeded those permissibly given to the agency in Crowell.42 Not
only did bankruptcy courts exercise broad subject matter jurisdic-
tion that extended beyond "traditional matters of bankruptcy,"
the bankruptcy courts also exhibited "all ordinary powers of dis-
trict courts," including, among others, "the power to preside over
jury trials. ' 43 Because ultimate control was not retained in the
district courts, Congress, in the 1978 Act, had exceeded its consti-
tutional ability to assign matters to the bankruptcy adjuncts.
Northern Pipeline set forth a two-pronged analysis for deter-
mining what matters Congress constitutionally may assign to bank-
ruptcy courts. First, matters involving "public rights," as defined
by Court precedent, may be entrusted to bankruptcy courts. Sec-
ond, a bankruptcy court may serve as an adjunct of an Article III
district court if it performs only limited functions (i.e., not "es-
sential attributes" of the judicial power) and is subject to ultimate
control by the Article III district court. The jurisdictional provi-
,o Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80-81 (footnote omitted).
4" Id. at 84.
42 See id. at 84-86.
13 Id. at 85.
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sions of the 1978 Act did not meet either criterion and thus violated
Article III.
C. The 1984 Act
Congress responded to Northern Pipeline with the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("the 1984 Act").44
Congress could have resolved the infirmities discovered in Northern
Pipeline by giving Article III status to bankruptcy judges,45 but
instead it attempted to retain the expanded bankruptcy jurisdiction
through other means. Bankruptcy courts, composed of bankruptcy
judges in each judicial district, were denominated as "units" of
the Article III district courts. 46 Original jurisdiction over bank-
ruptcy matters was vested in the district courts.47 The district courts
could refer bankruptcy cases and proceedings to bankruptcy judges.4
The bankruptcy courts, in turn, were given authority to "hear and
determine" and enter final orders in certain "core" proceedings
enumerated in the statute.49 Such final orders were subject only to
appellate review by the district courts.5 0 As to non-core matters,
bankruptcy courts were given the power to "hear" but not to enter
final orders.5 1 In such cases, the 1984 Act required bankruptcy
courts to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
to the district courts for de novo, as. opposed to appellate, review.5 2
Because the 1984 Act gave bankruptcy courts "hear and deter-
mine" jurisdiction over some core matters that were traditionally
plenary proceedings with attendant jury trial rights, 53 it raised the
question of whether a defendant in such a proceeding had the right
to a jury trial. This problem had not existed under the 1898 Act,
because plenary proceedings had been conducted in non-bankruptcy
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
41 See Gibson, supra note 11, at 1006 nn.183-84.
- See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
47 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988).
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).
- See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988).
- See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988).
5" See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988). However, with consent of the parties, a bankruptcy
court was given "hear and determine" power over non-core matters as well. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c)(2) (1988).
1- 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
53 For example, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (1988), an action to recover a fraud-
ulent conveyance is designated as a "core" matter. Fraudulent conveyance actions tradi-
tionally were handled in plenary proceedings. See Gibson, supra note 11, at 972 n.24.
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forums, which could provide jury trials.54 The Supreme Court
resolved this issue in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg.
II. GRANriNANCmRA AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
In the facts underlying Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,55 the
trustee had filed an action, as authorized by the terms of a con-
firmed Chapter 11 plan, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida to recover allegedly fraudulent trans-
fers made to the defendants by the debtor corporation's predeces-
sors. The defendants had filed no claim against the bankruptcy
estate. The district court referred the suit to the bankruptcy court,
and the defendants requested a jury trial. The bankruptcy court
denied the request, reasoning that the fraudulent conveyance action
was a core proceeding under which the defendants had no jury
trial right.5 6 The district court and court of appeals affirmed. 7 The
court of appeals reasoned that no Seventh Amendment jury trial
right exists in core proceedings and that bankruptcy proceedings
themselves are "inherently equitable in nature." '58
The Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether a person
who has not submitted a claim against a bankruptcy estate has a
right to a jury trial when sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to
recover an allegedly fraudulent monetary transfer. '59
At the outset, the Court noted that the lack of any express
statutory authority entitling the defendants to a jury trial would
force any such right to be premised on the Seventh Amendment °
The Court then introduced its Seventh Amendment analysis:
First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions
brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts
of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and
-' See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
55 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
5 See id. at 33.
In re Chase & Sanborn Corp. v. Granfinanciera, S.A., No. 86-1292-CIV-JLK (S.D.
Fla. 1986), aff'd 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988).
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 33.
19 Id. at 36.
60 See id. at 39. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
1991-92]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature. The second
stage of this analysis is more important than the first. If, on the
balance, these two factors indicate that a party is entitled to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, we must decide whether
Congress may assign and has assigned resolution of the relevant
claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that does not use a
jury as a factfinderA'
Application of this analysis followed. In the first part, the
Court concluded that actions to recover fraudulent or preferential
transfers customarily were brought at law in 18th-century Eng-
land . 2 Although acknowledging the trustee's claim that some
fraudulent transfer actions were brought at equity in 18th-century
England, the Court held that, because the present action sought
monetary relief, it clearly would have been brought at law during
that period.63 Thus, the first step of the Seventh Amendment
analysis indicated the necessity for a jury trial.
The Court then examined the nature of the remedy sought by
the trustee to determine whether it was equitable or legal. Relying
on earlier decisions, such as Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 6 the
Court stated that an action may not be deemed as one seeking
equitable relief if there is an adequate legal remedy present.6 5
Because the considered action sought the return of a definite amount
of money, an adequate legal remedy, the Court held that the
trustee's action entitled the defendants to a jury trial, unless the
third portion of the Seventh Amendment analysis mandated oth-
erwise. 66
In the crucial third stage of the analysis, the Court examined
Congress's constitutional ability to assign a jury matter to a tri-
bunal that traditionally had not conducted jury trials. However, in
the opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized that the Court was con-
cerned only with the petitioner's right to a jury trial, rather than
with the bankruptcy court's authority to conduct a jury trial.67
"The sole issue before us is whether the Seventh Amendment
confers on petitioners a right to a jury trial in the face of Congress'
" Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 (citations omitted).
,2 See id. at 43.
"See id.
-287 U.S. 92 (1932).
OS See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 44-45.
See id. at 48-49.
6 See id. at 49.
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decision to allow a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate the claims
against them." "s
Relying on Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n,69 the Court noted that, when the Seventh Amend-
ment otherwise guaranties a jury trial, Congress may deny the right
only in actions involving "public rights." '70 "Public rights" tradi-
tionally had been limited to actions between an individual and the
government in its sovereign capacity.71 However, the Court held
that, under recent decisions, a statutory cause of action may involve
"public rights" if Congress, acting pursuant to its Article I power,
has created a right 'so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with
limited involvement by the Article III judiciary."' 72 If the right is
not "public," and the relief sought is legal, the Seventh Amend-
ment preserves the right to a jury trial.73
The Court determined that the trustee's action to avoid fraud-
ulent conveyances, when the defendants had not filed a claim
against the estate, was properly characterized as a "private right." 74
The Court reasoned that fraudulent conveyance actions "are quin-
tessentially suits at common law that more nearly resemble state-
law contract claims brought by a bankrupt corporation to augment
the bankruptcy estate than they do creditors' hierarchically ordered
claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res." 75
The lack of any claim by the defendants against the estate was
crucial to the Court's decision. 76 Due to this non-filing, the defen-
"Id. at 50.
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
" See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51.
7 See id. at 54.
7 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94
(1985)).
7 See id. at 54-55.
74 See id. at 55.
7- Id. at 56.
76 See id. at 57. The Court reconciled its holding with Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S.
323 (1968), solely on this ground. In Katchen, a creditor that had filed a claim against an
estate was denied a jury trial when the estate's trustee counterclaimed seeking recovery of
allegedly voidable preferences. In Granfinanciera, Justice Brennan explained that Katchen's
denial of jury trial rights was based on the bankruptcy court's actual or constructive
possession of the bankruptcy estate and "its power and obligation to consider objections
by the trustee in deciding whether to allow claims against the estate." Granfinanciera, 492
U.S. at 57. By filing a claim against the estate, the Katchen petitioner had transformed the
trustee's voidable preference action from one augmenting the estate into one involving the
"allowance and disallowance of claims" against the estate. See id. at 58.
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dants were ineligible to participate in any bankruptcy distribution:
Because petitioners here . . . have not filed claims against the
estate, respondent's fraudulent conveyance action does not arise
"as part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims."
Nor is that action integral to the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations. Congress therefore cannot divest petitioners of their
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.77
Significantly, the Court did not state that the process of allowance
and disallowance of claims, or the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations, is a public right.78 Indeed, Justice Brennan indicated that
the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations may not be a public
right29 Apparently, had the defendants filed a claim against the
estate, their forfeiture of a jury trial would have been premised on
their submitting to the bankruptcy court's equitable jurisdiction to
administer the estate.80
Finally, the Court concluded that Congress's designation of the
fraudulent conveyance action as a "core" proceeding in 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(H) would not change the result. Congress could not,
by including this action as a "core" matter, create a public right
"integrally related to the reformation of debtor-creditor rela-
tions." '81 According to the Court, Congress simply had relabeled a
common law cause of action revolving around private rights. Thus,
the Court reasons: "This purely taxonomic change cannot alter
our Seventh Amendment analysis." ' 82 Notwithstanding Congress's
"core" label for the fraudulent conveyance action, the defendants'
Seventh Amendment right remained intact because they had not
submitted to the bankruptcy court's equitable jurisdiction by en-
tering a claim against the estate.
III. Tim JuDIciAL RESPONSE TO GRANHM'ANCERA
Although it is clear that "core" proceedings are within the
"hear and determine" jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court, and that,
according to Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,s3 some "core"
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58-59.
7s See infra notes 170-182 and accompanying text (Any matters properly before a
bankruptcy court must involve a public right).
" See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56 n.11.
10 See infra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
" Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 60.
I d. at 61.
83 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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proceedings require a jury trial upon demand, whether a bank-
ruptcy judge may conduct a jury trial in such a situation is unre-
solved. Many lower courts have addressed this issue in the wake
of Granfinanciera, which failed to provide an answer.Y
A. Cases Upholding Bankruptcy Court Authority to Conduct
Jury Trials
The Second Circuit introduced the primary analysis for up-
holding bankruptcy court jury trial authority in its recent decision
Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co.85 In that case, the debtor
purchased fire insurance from the Insurance Company of the State
of Pennsylvania ("ICSP") for a warehouse, as required by the
terms of its confirmed plan of reorganization. The warehouse
burned, and the debtor tried to collect on the policy. ICSP filed
an action in state court seeking to cancel the insurance policy,
alleging misrepresentation by the debtor. The debtor had the state
court action stayed and filed an adversary proceeding in the bank-
ruptcy court to collect on the policy. ICSP objected to the bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction. The district court held that the action
was not a "core" matter, within the bankruptcy court's exclusive
jurisdiction, since ICSP had the right to a jury trial.16 The district
court abstained and granted relief from the stay so that the matter
The issue of jury trial authority applies only to "core" proceedings. Under the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, non-core matters are not
subject to the bankruptcy court's "hear and determine" jurisdiction. The bankruptcy court
may not issue final orders in non-core proceedings, unless the parties consent. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c)(2) (1988). Therefore, the courts generally agree that jury trial authority is not an
issue in non-core matters because such matters may be tried by jury before the district
court. Indeed, several commentators have indicated that trying non-core matters by jury in
the bankruptcy court would violate the Seventh Amendment's clause mandating that "no
fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,"
because such jury findings still would be subject to de novo review by the district court
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988). See, e.g., Conrad K. Cyr, THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
IN B~ANKRuTrCy: WHICH JUDGE IS TO PREsIE?, 63 Am. BANKR. L.J. 53, 59 (1989); see also
Gibson, supra note 11, at 1045-48.
- 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.), vacated, -U.S. - , I1I S. Ct. 25 (1990), previous
opinion and judgment reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S. - , Ill
S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
" See Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394,
1396-97 (2d Cir.), vacated, .... U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 25 (1990), previous opinion and
judgment reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, .__U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 2041
(1991).
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could proceed to trial in state court, even though the dispute
appears to have been a matter arising in a bankruptcy case.8 7
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court. It held
that the debtor-initiated adversary proceeding, although essentially
a state contract claim, was a "core" proceeding because the claim
arose post-petition and therefore involved administration of the
estate.88 The court followed the Granfinanciera analysis89 to deter-
mine that, because the debtor's claim was legal in nature, ICSP,
by not filing a claim against the estate, had preserved its right to
a jury trial. 9°
The court then addressed the issue that Granfinanciera had
avoided-the bankruptcy court's authority to preside over a jury
trial. It examined the 1984 Act and found no express authority to
support or deny bankruptcy court jury trial authority.91 The court
then relied on an implied authority analysis:
§ 157(b)... gives bankruptcy judges the authority to conduct
trials and issue final orders in core proceedings. Granfinanciera
teaches that such proceedings, if legal in nature, are subject to
the Seventh Amendment, but that opinion does not alter Con-
gress' intent that they be heard by a bankruptcy court with
authority to issue final orders. Construing the Bankruptcy Code
to allow jury trials in the bankruptcy court is the only way to
reconcile these various concerns.92
After finding this implied authority, the court considered the
constitutional limitations on giving a bankruptcy court jury trial
authority. The court held that the Seventh Amendment presents
no limitation to jury trials in core matters. 93 Further, the court
held that Article III poses no bar, assuming that bankruptcy juris-
diction over all "core" matters is constitutional. 94
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) - (2) (1988) ("district courts should have original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related
to cases under title ll.").
" See Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1400 (applying 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(2)(A) (1988)).
See supra part II.
" See Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1400-02.
9, See id. at 1402.
9Id.
91 See id. at 1403. The court did acknowledge that jury trials in nonconsensual non-
core matters might violate the Seventh Amendment because the findings of a jury in such
matters would be subject to de novo review at the district court. See id. at 1403; supra note
84; infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
'1 See Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403.
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Additional reasoning has been offered in support of the au-
thority of a bankruptcy court to preside over a jury trial. One
court95 has noted that the Emergency Rule,9 adopted after North-
ern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,9 con-
tained an express prohibition against a bankruptcy court conducting
a jury trial. That this prohibition was not incorporated into the
1984 Act, making it a "notable exception" in that regard, indicates
that Congress impliedly left jury trial authority with the bankruptcy
courts. 98
Another analysis focuses on the interplay between 28 U.S.C. §
1411 and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) in the 1984 Act.9 Section 1411(a)
provides that the Code does "not affect any right to trial by jury
that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with
regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim."'1' Sec-
tion 157(b)(5) requires that such actions be tried in. the district
court.'0' Some courts posit that these provisions do not preclude
but, instead, support jury trials in bankruptcy court because the
statute specifies that only personal injury and wrongful death jury
trials are to be held in non-bankruptcy courts.1°
Finally, many courts have upheld jury trial authority in the
bankruptcy court by relying upon the absence of any express or
implied prohibition in the 1984 Act. 03
B. Cases Denying Bankruptcy Court Authority to Conduct Jury
Trials
Shortly after the Second Circuit's decision in Ben Cooper, the
Eighth Circuit held, in In re United Missouri Bank, N.A., 04 that
a bankruptcy court has no authority to conduct a jury trial. In
that case, the bankruptcy trustee sued the bank to recover an
" Raliegh v. Stoecker (In re Stoecker), 117 B.R. 342, 346 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1990).
6 The Emergency Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which prohibited jury trials, were
passed by Congress in response to the Marathon decision.
91 For a discussion of Northern Pipeline, see supra notes 21-43 and accompanying
text.
9, See Stoecker, 117 B.R. at 344.
See, e.g., Perion v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 B.R. 453 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
'" 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1988).
,01 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988).
112 See, e.g., Cohen, 107 B.R. at 455. But see infra notes 118-120 and accompanying
text.
'0 See Gibson, supra note 11, at 1030 n.299 (citing cases).
901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990).
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allegedly preferential transfer. The bank demanded a jury trial.
The bankruptcy court and district court agreed that the bankruptcy
court had the authority to conduct a jury trial.10
The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court applied the Granfinan-
ciera analysis to hold that because the bank had not filed a proof
of claim against the estate, it had retained a Seventh Amendment
jury trial right. 1°6 Yet, the court then proceeded to its determination
that the bankruptcy court was without authority to accommodate
this right.
The court found the absence of any express statutory jury trial
authority compelling, especially because in other non-Article III
situations, such as with federal magistrates, Congress specifically
has provided for jury trial authority:
Congress has previously provided express statutory authority to
conduct jury trials to a non-Article III tribunal ... and thus, we
believe, is aware of the language necessary to expressly grant that
authority. The language of the 1984 Act does not grant jury]
trial authority. 10 7
The court then addressed the Second Circuit's implied authority
reasoning.108 Relying largely on the legislative history of the 1984
Act, the Eighth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's analysis:
We find this to be a faulty syllogism. We think it more plausible
that Congress simply intended to transfer all proceedings relating
to the bankruptcy estate to the sole jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court without regard to whether a party was entitled to a jury
trial, or which forum would conduct the trial. In fact, it appears
Congress did not even consider the need to provide jury trial
authority. As the Supreme Court pointed out: "Thus, the 1984
Amendments' denial of the right to a jury trial in preference and
fraudulent conveyance actions can hardly be said to represent
Congress' considered judgment of the constitutionality of this
change." If Congress did not consider the constitutionality de-
nying jury trials, we doubt if it considered the need to provide
for authority for the bankruptcy court to conduct a jury trial.1°9
,01 See In re United Mo. Bank, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449, 1450 (8th Cir. 1990).
106 See id. at 1452.
Mo Id. at 1454 (citations omitted).
106 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
,o9 See United Mo., 901 F.2d at 1456.
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The Tenth Circuit has approved the United Missouri ap-
proach, 110 adding this discussion:
A literal reading of [section 157(b)(1)] indicates that Congress
granted the bankruptcy judges the personal power to hear and
determine cases. The personal nature of the power to "hear and
determine" cases does not implicitly authorize the bankruptcy
judge to delegate his or her duty to make final actual determi-
nations to a jury; in fact, it suggests the impropriety of such
delegation .... I
Other rationales further support the conclusion that a bank-
ruptcy court has no jury trial authority. Some rely on language in
the Northern Pipeline plurality opinion.112 There, Justice Brennan
noted that the 1978 Act's jurisdictional scheme unconstitutionally
vested bankruptcy courts with the "essential attributes," including
the power to conduct a jury trial, of Article III judges.113 Some
courts interpret this language to mean that the power to conduct
a jury trial is by itself an essential Article III attribute, which may
not be assigned constitutionally to non-Article III bankruptcy
judges. 114
One court has relied on the recent Supreme Court decision in
Gomez v. United States"5 to propose that in order for a non-
Article III tribunal to exercise jury trial authority, such authority
must not only be express, it must also be specific." 6 Under this
11 See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380, 389-91
(10th Cir. 1990).
"' Id. at 391.
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 389.
' See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 389-91. For a discussion of whether jury trial
authority is an essential attribute of the Article III judicial power, see infra notes 160-169
and accompanying text.
15 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
116 See In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc., 107 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). The court
reasoned:
The Supreme Court's recent unanimous decision . . determined that the
Federal Magistrates Act did not allow the delegation of jury selection to a
magistrate, absent consent of the parties .... [Tihe Supreme Court concluded
that "[t]he absence of a specific reference to jury selection in the statute ...
or indeed, in the legislative history, persuades us that Congress did not intend
the additional duties clause ... to embrace this function."
[I]t must be recognized that, even though Congress enacted a statute
which provided specific authorization for a magistrate to conduct a jury trial,
in order to avoid the implicit constitutional conflicts, the Supreme Court
determined Congress did not intend by the "catchall provision" of the statute
to authorize magistrates to conduct a jury selection process ....
Id. at 570-71 (citations omitted).
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approach, because the 1984 Act contains no such express, much
less specific, provision, the authority may not be read into, or
implied in, the Act. 17
A narrow interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1411 and 157(b)(5)
further supports the lack of statutory authority analysis." 8 Under
this reasoning, because Congress specifically provided for statutory
jury trial rights only in personal injury and wrongful death situa-
tions (as specified in § 1411), it certainly did not grant jury trial
authority in other matters, for which no jury trial rights exist." 9
Furthermore, Congress specified that statutorily authorized jury
trials are to be conducted in federal district court. 20 This indicates
that Congress would not agree to jury trials in bankruptcy court
when jury trial rights are not even authorized by statute.
Finally, at least one court has touched upon an Article II
principal-inferior officer analysis.' 2 ' Relying on Morrison v. Ol-
sen,'2 2 where the Supreme Court enumerated the characteristics of
a principal officer, this court reasoned:
Rather than dwell on the topic, we merely observe that by apply-
ing this test to determine whether sitting Bankruptcy Judges are
inferior officers, we stretch the definition of inferior officers to
its broadest boundaries. We believe the application of the Mor-
rison rationale confronts the appellate courts with a "Catch 22":
a holding that Bankruptcy Judges can conduct jury trials would
serve as the same rationale for a holding that such power causes
Bankruptcy Judges to transgress the line from an inferior officer
(which can be appointed under the current procedure) to a prin-
cipal officer which can only be appointed by the President! In
other words, if Bankruptcy Courts have the right to conduct jury
trials, then the appointing process is defective and they have no
power at all! 23
The previous line of cases strongly reflects the proposition that
because there is no statutory authority for bankruptcy judges to
conduct jury trials, no jury trial authority exists.
117 Id. at 571.
" See Wilkey v. Inter-Trade, Inc. (In re Owensboro Distilling Co.), 108 B.R. 572,
576 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1989).
"I See id. (citing In re G. Weeks See., 89 B.R. 697, 704 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988)).
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
1 See Inter-Trade, 108 B.R. at 577.
1- 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
3 Inter-Trade, 108 B.R. at 577.
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C. An Analysis of the Positions
1. Weaknesses of the Position Upholding Bankruptcy Court
Authority
The obvious weakness in the position upholding bankruptcy
court jury trial authority is the absence of any express statutory
grant, particularly in light of Congress's explicit provision in other
non-Article III contexts.12
For example, Congress expressly has provided jury trial au-
thority, with the parties' consent, for magistrates. 25 Congress's
provision for jury trials before magistrates, along with the common
belief that Congress had provided for jury trials in bankruptcy
courts under the 1978 Act, 2 6 indicates that, if Congress had in-
tended for jury trials to be conducted in bankruptcy court under
the 1984 Act, it would have said so explicitly. At best, Congress's
failure to specify indicates that the matter was never considered
during adoption of the 1984 Act.127
The implied statutory authority reasoning is also flawed. This
analysis attempts to reconcile a bankruptcy court's "hear and
determine" jurisdiction in "core" matters with Granfinanciera's
holding that a litigant will have a right to a jury trial in certain
"core" matters. Thus:
Granfinanciera teaches that [core] proceedings, if legal in nature,
are subject to the Seventh Amendment, but that opinion does
not alter Congress' intent that they be heard by a bankruptcy
court with authority to issue final orders. Construing the Bank-
ruptcy Code to allow jury trials in the bankruptcy court is the
only way to reconcile these various concerns.' l
Such reasoning assumes Congress's understanding that certain
"core" matters would remain subject to the Seventh Amendment,
'A That Congress would grant such specific authority to magistrates, see 28 U.S.C. §
636(a)(3), (c)(1) (1988), indicates that Congress, if so inclined, would have done so for
bankruptcy judges, bolstering the argument that Congress probably never really considered
the matter at the drafting of the 1984 Act. See Gibson, supra note 11, at 1028 n.289.
Furthermore, although magistrates and District of Columbia judges may conduct jury trials,
such does not necessarily undermine the argument that Article III prohibits bankruptcy
judges from doing so. See In re Johnson, 115 B.R. 712, 715 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1990).
I- See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
'1 See Gibson, supra note 11, at 975.
" See id. at 1028 n.289.
128 Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402.
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notwithstanding the exclusive assignment of "core" matters to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Yet, this issue was not decided
until Granfinanciera, nearly five years after the enactment of sec-
tion 157(b). Congress could not have known with certainty that
such problems would arise because of jury trial rights in some core
matters. Additionally, the legislative history indicates that Congress
never contemplated jury trials in bankruptcy. 129
Another weakness of the implied authority reasoning is its
underlying assumption that bankruptcy "core" jurisdiction is con-
stitutional.130 If "core" jurisdiction is not constitutional, then the
rationale of the implied authority analysis, i.e., the need to rec-
oncile "hear and determiine" jurisdiction with the jury trial right,
is not valid.' 31 The Supreme Court has not addressed the consti-
tutionality of "core" jurisdiction. 32 There is, however, authority
suggesting that the 1984 Act's designation of exclusive "core"
jurisdiction is unconstitutional. 3
Although bankruptcy court jury trial authority may be appeal-
ing to some courts, neither judicial nor legislative precedent sup-
ports a finding of such authority in the 1984 Act.
2. Weaknesses of the Position Denying Bankruptcy Court
Authority
The cases denying bankruptcy jury trial power present -few
flaws. However, reliance on the Northern Pipeline dicta as support
for the proposition that the power to conduct a jury trial is an
essential Article III attribute 34 is not well-founded. In determining
whether the 1978 Act vested too many Article III attributes in the
non-Article III bankruptcy "adjuncts," Justice Brennan concluded:
Unlike the [permissible] administrative scheme that we re-
viewed in Crowell, the [1978] Act vests all "essential attributes"
of the judicial power of the United States in the "adjunct"
119 See Gibson, supra note 11, at 1028.
110 The Ben Cooper court expressly conditioned its holding on the constitutionality of
"core" jurisdiction. See Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403.
"I If this is the case, matters implicating the Seventh Amendment would have to be
tried in district court.
,32 See Gibson, supra note 11, at 1040 n.345.
'" See, e.g., L.T. Ruth Coal Co. v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co. (In re L.T. Ruth
Coal Co.), 66 B.R. 753 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1986); see also J. Ferriell, Constitutionality of
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 63 At. BAINK. L.J. 109,
113 (1989) (discussing the constitutional problems in the current bankruptcy structure).
,34 See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy court .... [T]he bankruptcy courts exercise all ordi-
nary powers of district courts, including the power to preside
over jury trials.., the power to issue declaratory judgments...
the power to issue writs of habeas corpus ... and the power to
issue any order, process, or judgment appropriate for the enforce-
ment of the provisions of Title 11 .... "I
This finding was not necessary to the judgment in the case. 36 It
seems a stretch to rely on this passage for the proposition that
assigning any single one of the enumerated attributes, such as the
power to preside over jury trials, to a non-Article III court violates
Article 111.137 Justice Brennan spoke of the attributes in the aggre-
gate; it was their composite effect that vested too much Article III
power in a n6n-Article III court. 3 8 Therefore, though jury power
may indeed be an Article III attribute not constitutionally assign-
able to a non-Article III court, reliance on Northern Pipeline to
support the proposition is unpersuasive.
In addition, dependence on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1411 and 157(b)(5),
which together require that personal injury and wrongful death
trials be held before a jury in district court, for the proposition
that Congress intended no jury trials to be conducted by a bank-
ruptcy court is unconvincing. As proponents of the contrary view
point out, these statutes may only reflect Congress's preference
that certain jury trials not be tried in bankruptcy court, and not
necessarily that no jury trials be conducted there. 39
Despite its minor flaws, the view denying authority finds strong
support in the fact that no provision of the 1984 Act addresses the
bankruptcy court's authority to conduct a jury trial.
3. Weaknesses of Both Positions
The diametric positions regarding bankruptcy court authority
differ on one essential point: the place of statutory authority in
' Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-85
(1982) (emphasis added).
"6 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan already had con-
cluded that the Northern Pipeline action did not involve congressionally created rights and
that only very limited functions could therefore be assigned to non-Article III adjuncts. See
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80-83.
"3 See Cyr, supra note 84, at 59.
'3' See Tazel v. Electronic Sports Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.), 111 B.R. 902,
905 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990) (court states it is impossible to conclude that Article III forbids
bankruptcy courts from conducting jury trials in core matters based on the "vague dictum"
of Northern Pipeline), rev'd, 916 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1990).
139 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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the analysis. One view relies on the absence of an express statutory
prohibition to support its view that a bankruptcy court can conduct
a jury trial. 140 The other view relies on the absence of an express
statutory grant of authority to support the proposition that a
bankruptcy court cannot preside over a jury trial. 41
To some extent, however, any reliance on statutory authority
overlooks the more important requirement of constitutional au-
thority. District courts, with one narrow exception, 42 are given no
statutory authority in the 1984 Act to conduct jury trials. 4 1 Yet,
their ability to do so is unquestioned. 44 The district court situation
indicates that bankruptcy courts do not necessarily require statutory
jury trial authority. On the other hand, it is possible, even with
statutory authority, that a bankruptcy court might have no power
to conduct a jury trial due to the absence of constitutional au-
thority.
Therefore, the analysis of bankruptcy court jury trial authority
should begin with the constitutional limitations imposed on Con-
gress. If Congress has no authority to allow a bankruptcy court to
conduct a jury trial, statutory authority, whether present or not,
is meaningless.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: ARTICLE III, BANKRUPTCY
COURT JURISDICTION, AND PUBLIC RIGHTS
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co. 45 sets out the Article III limitations on Congress's ability to
confer jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts. Article III prohibits as-
signing jurisdiction over matters to bankruptcy courts unless 1) the
matters involve public rights, or 2) only limited functions are
assigned, with ultimate authority remaining in the Article III dis-
trict courts. 46
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg47 imposes certain additional
constitutional restrictions on Congress. Under that decision, Con-
gress may not deprive a defendant of Seventh Amendment jury
140 See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 104-123 and accompanying text.
,42 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988) (granting express power to try personal injury and
wrongful death claims in the district court in which the bankruptcy proceeding is pending).
141 Gibson, supra note 11, at 1028 n.289.
'"Id.
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
,46 See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
1- 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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trial rights simply by assigning the matter to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of a court of equity, such as a bankruptcy court.
48
These decisions both bear on the question of bankruptcy court
jury trial authority because jurisdiction and jury trials are closely
related, if not inseparable, in the bankruptcy context.1 49 Histori-
cally, an action that implicated jury trial rights was not subject to
the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction. The matter was con-
sidered a plenary proceeding, to be tried in state or federal district
court where the jury trial could be conducted. 150 Conversely, bank-
ruptcy courts exercised summary jurisdiction over matters not con-
cerning a jury trial right, such as those involving the bankruptcy
res in the bankruptcy court's constructive or actual possession.
15 1
A reconciliation of Northern Pipeline and Granfinanciera indicates,
though not without serious conceptual problems, 5 2 that a bank-
ruptcy court has no authority to conduct a jury trial in a core
proceeding.
A. The Public Rights Analysis
The Court employed the public rights doctrine in both Northern
Pipeline and Granfinanciera. Congress, according to Northern
Pipeline, is limited by the public rights doctrine in its ability to
avoid Article III requirements. 153 If a matter does not involve public
rights, Article III bars assignment of jurisdiction over the matter
to the bankruptcy courts. Similarly, Congress may not circumvent
the Seventh Amendment unless public rights are involved.1 4 If a
matter involves private rights, the right to a jury trial remains
intact, so long as the matter is of a legal nature.1Y5
Apparently, the use of the public rights doctrine in both the
Article III and Seventh Amendment contexts was no accident.
Granfinanciera emphasized the connection:
141 See supra notes 67-73, 84 and accompanying text.
"41 See Warner, Katchen Up in Bankruptcy: The New Jury Trial Right, 63 AM. BaNKaR.
L.J. 1, 4 (1989).
I" See Gibson, supra note 11, at 971-72.
"5 Id.
1 2 See infra notes 170-182 and accompanying text.
,,3 See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
,1 See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 n.4 ("The Seventh Amendment protects a
litigant's right to a jury trial only if a cause of action is legal in nature and it involves a
matter of 'private right.').
"I See supra notes 73, 78-80 and accompanying text.
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[I]f a statutory cause of action is legal in nature, the question
whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to assign its
adjudication to a tribunal that does not employ juries as fact-
finders requires the same answer as the question whether Article
III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action
to a non-Article III tribunal. For if a statutory cause of action
... is not a "public right" for Article III purposes, then Con-
gress may not assign its adjudication to a specialized non-Article
III court lacking "the essential attributes of the judicial power."
And if the action must be tried under the auspices of an Article
III court, then the Seventh Amendment affords the parties a right
to a jury trial whenever the cause of action is legal in nature.
Conversely, if Congress may assign the adjudication of a statutory
cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal, then the Seventh
Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that
action by a nonjury factfinder156
Following this logic, if a jury trial right survives, the jury trial
must be held in an Article III court. For example, if a case involves
public rights, then, under Northern Pipeline, Congress may assign
jurisdiction over the matter to the bankruptcy court. Because the
matter involves public rights, the defendant's right to a jury trial
will not be preserved under Granfinanciera.
Consider, then, the opposite situation. If a matter involves no
public rights, and legal relief is sought,' 57 then the defendant will
retain its Seventh Amendment jury trial right. 158 However, the
question of who may conduct this jury trial should already be
decided. As a "private rights" issue, the matter may not, under
Northern Pipeline, be assigned to the non-Article III bankruptcy
court. In short, "private rights" matters, the only matters in which
jury trial rights survive, should always be tried in Article III
courts.'59 If the Seventh Amendment right remains intact, the case
'-6 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53-54 (citations omitted).
1" Remember, under the Seventh Amendment jury trial right analysis, jury trial rights
are not implicated if the matter is one that would have been tried in equity in 18th-century
England or if the matter seeks only equitable relief. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying
text.
,"1 This was the factual situation in Granfinanciera.
159 The Court, in Granfinanciera, should have specified that the particular action
involved could not be subject to bankruptcy court jurisdiction consistent with Article III.
Apparently, however, the Court did not realize the implications of tying the Article III and
Seventh Amendment analyses together with the public rights doctrine. If it had, the Court
would have understood that it could not dispose of the jury trial right issue without
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necessarily should be subject to an Article III court's jurisdiction.
A reconciliation of the Northern Pipeline and Granfinanciera pub-
lic rights analyses indicates that a bankruptcy court's authority to
conduct a jury trial should never be an issue.
D. The Adjunct Analysis
Northern Pipeline left open an additional basis (other than
public rights) for jury trial authority in a non-Article III court. 60
Justice Brennan stated that, in certain situations, limited functions
may be assigned to a non-Article III adjunct, so long as the Article
III court retains the "essential attributes of the judicial power,"
or sufficient control over the adjunct.16'
Under the adjunct theory, it may be suggested that a bank-
ruptcy judge, as a "unit"'' of the district court, may be assigned
limited functions, such as the authority to preside over a jury trial,
without violating Article III. The Supreme Court has not decided
whether the power to preside over a jury trial is alone an "essential
attribute" of the judicial power of the United States. 6 3
Nonetheless, the adjunct theory should not serve as a basis for
a bankruptcy court's authority to conduct a jury trial.' 64 Northern
Pipeline emphasized that the "ultimate decisionmaking authority"
must remain with the Article III court:
In United States v. Raddatz ... the Court upheld the 1978
Federal Magistrates Act, which permitted district court judges to
refer certain pretrial motions ... to a magistrate for initial
determination. The Court observed that the magistrate's proposed
findings and recommendations were subject to de novo review by
the district court .... In short, the ultimate decisionmaking
addressing jury trial authority.
This omission carries broader implications. Granfinanciera indicated that the 1984
Act's "core" matter jurisdictional scheme is unconstitutional to the extent that cases in
which jury trial rights survive are assigned to a bankruptcy court. The failure to strike
down "core" matter jurisdiction explains why the issue of jury trial authority frequently
has been raised in subsequent cases. If the Supreme Court had held expressly that "core"
matters may not be assigned to bankruptcy courts when jury trial rights exist, the issue of
jury trial authority never would have surfaced.
,W See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
,6, See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77.
" 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
2 In Northern Pipeline, the plurality concluded only that assigning jury trial authority,
with other powers, to a bankruptcy court unconstitutionally vested the "essential attributes
of the judicial power" in a bankruptcy court. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying
text.
'6" See Cyr, supra note 84.
1991-92]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRN[O8
authority respecting all pretrial motions clearly remained with the
district court.
[I]n refusing to invalidate the Magistrates Act at issue in Raddatz,
the Court stressed that under the congressional scheme '[t]he
authority-and the responsibility-to make an informed, final
decision ... remains with the judge,"' ....
Critical to the Court's decision to uphold the Magistrate's Act
was the fact that the ultimate decision was made by the district
court. 1
65
Under the 1984 Act, the ultimate decision making authority does
not remain with the district court in core matters. Section 157(b)(1)
gives the bankruptcy court authority to "hear and determine" and
enter "appropriate orders and judgments" in these proceedings. 16
The district court's power, or decision making authority, is limited
to appellate review. 167
If the jury trial authority of a bankruptcy judge is limited to
"hearing" matters, subject to district court de novo review, other
constitutional problems arise. The Seventh Amendment's second
clause requires that "no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law."'u It has been suggested that giving a
district court de novo review over a bankruptcy court jury's factual
findings would violate this second clause. 69 Therefore, if Congress
'16 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79-83 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988).
167 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988). Further:
If the district court may not conduct a second jury trial, and may not provide
de novo review of the jury verdict, there seems to be no escaping the fact that
the district court will be found to have relinquished the judicial control
constitutionally required to assure compliance with article III by permitting
the bankruptcy judge to preside at any seventh amendment jury trial.
Cyr, supra note 84, at 61.
I6 U.S. CONST. amend. VII, cl. 2.
269 See Cyr, supra note 84, at 60. Cyr's analysis focuses on both clauses of the Seventh
Amendment. According to that author, if a bankruptcy court can provide a common law
jury trial, so as to satisfy the first clause, then for the second clause to be satisfied, no
additional jury trial, nor de novo review, may be provided by a district court. Cyr relies
on Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899), in his analysis:
The Hof message is that had the trial before the District of Columbia
justice of the peace been considered a common law trial by jury, within the
meaning of the first clause of the seventh amendment, there could not,
consistent with the second clause of the seventh amendment ... have been a
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attempted to "lessen" the bankruptcy court's functions by taking
away its power to enter final judgments in core matters, the bank-
ruptcy judge still could not preside over a jury trial without a
Seventh Amendment violation.
For all practical purposes, the power to preside over a jury
trial is an "essential attribute" of the judicial power that may not
be assigned to a non-Article III bankruptcy court. The theory that
bankruptcy courts are mere adjuncts, or units, of Article III courts
does not provide a sound basis for upholding the authority of
bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials.
C. Problems with the Public Rights Analysis
1. Conceptual Problems
As indicated, reconciling Northern Pipeline and Granfinanciera
requires the conclusion that 1) private rights matters, the only
matters in which jury trial rights survive, should never be before
a non-Article III bankruptcy court and 2) public rights matters, in
which jury trial rights do not survive, will present no problems.
Though a tidy result, it creates conceptual problems.
The major problem is applying the public rights doctrine to the
bankruptcy system itself. Under Northern Pipeline, a bankruptcy
court cannot exercise jurisdiction over any matter that is not a
public right. 70 It follows that unless a bankruptcy court is an
adjunct, any matters "properly" before a bankruptcy court must
involve public rights. Justice Brennan conceded as much in North-
ern Pipeline, when he indicated that the restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations, the core of the bankruptcy power, may be a
public right.'17
second jury trial before the appellate court, as prescribed by Congress.
Cyr, supra note 84, at 60. The 1984 Act, at 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988), does provide for
de novo review, indicating that a bankruptcy court may not provide the first jury trial
consistent with the Seventh Amendment's second clause.
"10 Under that decision, a non-Article III court can exercise jurisdiction, i.e.; the judicial
power, only if one of the three enumerated exceptions applies, or if the non-Article III
court is a mere adjunct of an Article III court. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying
text. Although Northern Pipeline represented only a plurality opinion, the Court apparently
adopted the public rights analysis in Granfinanciera. See supra note 154, 156 and accom-
panying text.
"I See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71.
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Although Justice Brennan (and the Court) retreated from this
position,172 Granfinanciera does support the conclusion that the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is a public right. Remem-
ber, Granfinanciera held that a jury trial right does not survive if
public rights are involved. 173 The basis for upholding the defen-
dants' jury trial right in that case was that a claim was not filed
against the bankruptcy estate.' 74 Thus, it follows that filing a claim
must somehow implicate public rights.1 7.
However, determining that the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations should be considered a public right, as that term has been
construed by the Court, is extremely questionable. In his concurring
opinion in Granfinanciera, Justice Scalia raised a legitimate concern
that the Court was impermissibly stretching the "public rights"
doctrine beyond its underlying rationale. Justice Scalia traced the
origin of the public rights doctrine to Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co.176 and concluded:
It is clear that what we meant by public rights were not rights
important to the public, or rights created by the public, but rights
of the public-that is, rights pertaining to claims brought by or
against the United States. For central to our reasoning was the
device of waiver of sovereign immunity .... Waiver of sovereign
immunity can only be implicated, of course, in suits where the
Government is a party.' 7
The public rights doctrine, as noted by Justice Brennan himself,
had traditionally applied only in suits "between the government
272 See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56 ("We do not suggest that the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.").
173 See supra note 154, 156 and accompanying text.
,74 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
's Granfinanciera did not state expressly that the filing of a claim converts an otherwise
private rights action into one involving public rights. Instead, the Court indicated that by
filing a claim a defendant submits to the bankruptcy court's equitable jurisdiction over
administration of the bankruptcy res. However, under the Court's Seventh Amendment
analysis set forth in Granfinanciera, once a claim is determined to be one that would have
been brought at law in 18th-century England, and one that seeks legal relief, the jury trial
right remains intact, even before a court of equity, unless the claim involves public rights.
Therefore, it should not matter that a defendant's proof of claim submits him to the
equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, assuming that the trustee's action against
him is at law and seeks legal relief, unless, and only unless, the equitable jurisdiction of
the court is equated with a public right. Since the opinion does hold that the filing of claim
operates as a forfeiture of the Seventh Amendment right, then it can only follow that the
filing of the claim has in some way brought public rights into play.
276 59 U.S. (1 How.) 272 (1856).
'77 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and others.' 17 In the bankruptcy context, where the government
is not a party, the waiver of sovereign immunity rationale has no
application. Thus, public rights should not be involved:
The notion that the power to adjudicate a legal controversy
between two private parties may be assigned to a non-Article III,
yet federal, tribunal is entirely inconsistent with the origins of the
public rights doctrine. 179
By incorporating the doctrine, the Court impliedly acknowledged
that public rights may be involved when the government is not a
party, thus undermining the policy of the public rights doctrine.
On the other hand, a finding that the restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations does not involve "public rights" brings into
question the constitutionality of the entire bankruptcy system. If,
as Northern Pipeline held, only "public rights" may serve as the
basis for bankruptcy court jurisdiction, but the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations is not a public right, any bankruptcy court
jurisdiction violates Article III.110 Significantly, the Court has never
addressed the constitutionality of the bankruptcy system.
Transporting the public rights analysis to the bankruptcy system
has placed the Supreme Court between a rock and a hard place.
First, for any bankruptcy court jurisdiction to be constitutional,
the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations must be a public right.
However, claiming that the restructuring of debtor-creditor rela-
tions is a public right is completely inconsistent with the rationale
of the public rights doctrine.
This critical analysis of the public rights doctrine, in the bank-
ruptcy context, may be little more than an exercise in semantics.
The substance, if not form, of Granfinanciera corresponds with
Court precedent. Under the 1898 Act, the administration of the
res, in a bankruptcy court's actual or constructive possession, was
subject to the court's equitable, or "summary," jurisdiction. 181 By
filing a claim against the res, a creditor submitted to this equitable
jurisdiction.'2 The result of Granfinanciera, that a creditor filing
a claim against the estate loses the jury trial right, is consistent
"' Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69.
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 66 (Scalia, J., concurring).
' It makes no difference that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity; the requirements
of Article III apply equally to cases in law and equity. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
"I See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
"0 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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with the "summary" jurisdiction scheme of the 1898 Act. While
the 1898 Act's basis for granting the court "summary" jurisdiction
remains unresolved, Granfinanciera, substantively, is not an aber-
ration.
B. Practical Problems
Granfinanciera's adoption of the public rights analysis also
raises an important practical question for creditors or potential
defendants in a bankruptcy case. If a defendant in a suit brought
by the trustee forfeits its jury trial right by filing a claim against
the estate, what exactly does it mean to "file a claim?" Does
participation on a creditors' committee, or in motion hearings,
absent anything else, constitute "filing a claim?" Has a person
"filed a claim" by filing a quiet title action, in which the debtor
or estate must be joined, on property in the person's possession?
The meaning of "filing a claim" assumes great significance under
Granfinanciera. It determines whether a case will be tried before a
jury in district court or without a jury in bankruptcy court.
The Court did not clarify what it means to file a claim. 183 As
a result, the lower courts have construed "filing a claim" with
undesirable inconsistency. Some define it broadly, requiring a cred-
itor to do very little before losing his or her ability to assert jury
trial rights. For example, some courts have held that a creditor's
filing of a counterclaim in an action initiated by the trustee or
debtor constitutes a disqualifying claim.'14 Another court has held
that participation in motion hearings is sufficient to forfeit Seventh
Amendment rights. 85
83 The extent of the court's explanation of "filing a claim" seems to be that one has
filed a disqualifying "claim" if, through its behavior, it submits to the process of allowance
and disallowance of claims:
As Katchen makes clear, however, by submitting a claim against the bank-
ruptcy estate, creditors subject themselves to the court's equitable power to
disallow those claims....
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 59 n.14.
I" See, e.g., Bayless v. Crabtree ex rel. Adams, 108 B.R. 299, 305 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1989) (holding, in an action brought by the trustee to recover from the debtor's children
real property conveyed to them by the debtor, that the children had consented to the court's
equitable jurisdiction by asserting a counterclaim challenging the debtor's ownership of the
property). But see Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 437-38 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding, in an
action by the debtor landlord against a lessee for breach of leases, that the lessee, who
counterclaimed for damages resulting from the poor conditions of the premises, was entitled
to a jury trial because he or she had not filed a proof of claim against the estate).
I" See In re Otasco, Inc., 110 B.R. 964 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
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Other courts interpret "filing a claim" narrowly. To these
courts, if a creditor has not filed a proof of claim, his or her
"private" rights remain intact. 86
This interpretive inconsistency is especially undesirable when a
constitutional right, e.g., the Seventh Amendment jury trial right,
is at stake. A creditor should not lose its Seventh Amendment
right in one jurisdiction but not in another for identical behavior
vis-a-vis the bankruptcy estate. If the public rights analysis is to
become determinative for jury trial rights, the concept of "filing
a claim" should be more clearly defined and more consistently
applied.
Although the public rights doctrine in Northern Pipeline and
Granfinanciera creates conceptual and interpretive problems, the
two cases do mesh well in application. A creditor that abstains
from filing a claim (once that term is specifically defined) is assured
that any action brought against it by the trustee will be triable
before a jury in an Article III court. On the other hand, the
creditor that files a claim will forfeit .his jury trial and Article III
rights. In these two decisions, the Court adheres to the substance,
though not the form, of the summary-plenary jurisdiction basis in
the 1898 Act. If, as the Court has impliedly held, Congress may
not expand summary jurisdiction, then it may not limit jury trial
rights or grant jury trial authority beyond the boundaries of the
1898 Act.
CONCLUSION
The judicial search for statutory authority supporting a bank-
ruptcy court's power to conduct a jury trial is not relevant because
Congress does not have the constitutional ability to grant such
I" See, e.g., Stoper v. Steelinter USA, Inc. (In re Industrial Supply Corp.), 108 B.R.
799, 801 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (A seller of goods to the debtor successfully reclaimed
the goods pursuant to section 546(c), 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1988), of the Bankruptcy Code.
The trustee brought an action to recover the goods, claiming that the reclamation constituted
a preference. The bankruptcy court held that, because the seller had not filed a proof of
claim, the seller's Seventh Amendment rights remained intact. The seller's previous recla-
mation complaint was not a disqualifying "claim" because it "did not bring into play the
process of allowance or disallowance of a claim."); see also Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d
434, 437-38 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 108 B.R. 82 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Paris Indus. Corp., 106 B.R. 344, 345 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989); In re
Edwards, 104 B.R. 890 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Fort Lauderdale Hotel Partner,
Ltd., 103 B.R. 335, 336 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989).
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authority. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co.'17 and Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg88 make it clear
that the Court will not accept an expansion of the summary/
plenary distinction of the 1898 Act. Under those decisions, Article
III and the Seventh Amendment work together to ensure that a
bankruptcy court should never be confronted with the question of
its authority to conduct a jury trial. 89
By relying on a unifying public rights analysis in these deci-
sions, the Court has created some conceptual and practical prob-
lems.190 However, if the Court adheres to its illogical application
of the public rights analysis, Congress will have little choice but to
reconsider its prior decisions against making bankruptcy judges
Article III judges.
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